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Chapter III
Rationality and Choice
Rationality and Non-rationality
In the previous chapter I outlined six positions which I
called non-rational in contrast to both rational and
irrational decisions and actions. They were depicted by the
substantive character of the decisions rather than the form of
reasoning used.
In order to analyze the character and form of rational
decisions, it will be helpful if we first clarify the formal
characteristics of patriotic and moralistic anti-war
decisions, of sceptical and empirical instrumental reasoning,
of external and internal historicism. If readers find this
chapter too abstract and intellectually dense, they may find
it easier to skip this chapter and deal with the same issues
when they are directly applied to the concrete problem of
authorizing the use of military force.
The formal elements of the different ways individuals
approach problems will be approached from four different
angles. In the next section we will distinguish reasons from
causes by contrasting events and actions and the difference
between looking at something from the inside outwards or from
the outside looking in. In the section which follows we will
contrast universalist versus communitarian approaches and
explore the relationship of rationality and values. After that
we will contrast reasoning and logic to argue that just
because someone is logical does not mean s/he is reasonable.
Finally, we will distinguish between rationalization and
rationality and, in the process, put forward a model of
reflexive rationality.
Actions and Decisions
Collingwood made a distinction between the 'inside' or
'thought side' of an action and the 'outside' or physical side
of an action. "An action is the unity of the outside and the
inside of an event."1 Caesar's physical passage with his men
across the Rubicon is a mere event. When we also look at the
reasons why Caesar crossed, when we examine the thought behind
the conduct, we focus on the inside of that action. An action
depicted only in terms of physical motion is a mere event. A
full depiction of an action must also include the inside or
thought side - the motives and purposes of the agent. In
William Dray2, an action has all the characteristics of an
event, but, in addition, has a thought-side made up of goals
and any policies qualifying those goals.3
Thus, the actual use of military force in the Gulf War
that we see on our television screens, for philosophers, is a
mere event. Yet when the ordinary man in the street thinks of
all the activity and ordinance employed in the war, which
includes the use of Flying Tankers, B-52 bombers, stealth
bombers, F/A-18 Hornets, F-14 Tomcats, EA-6B Prowlers, F-4G
Wild Weasel, Tornado GR1 jets, French Jaguars, F-4, F-14 and
F-15 Eagle and F-16 fighters, Buccaneers,
F-15E and A-6 Intruder fighter bombers, CF-18s, F-15s, Mirage
51s, EF-111 Ravens and FB-111 bombers, Apache helicopters,
SCUDs and tomahawk cruise surface or sea-launched missiles,
SAM (surface to air), SLAM (standoff land attack), TLAM
(tactical land attack missiles), HARM (high speed anti-
radiation missiles) and sparrow and sidewinder short-range
heat seeking air to air missiles, Patriot anti-missile
missiles,  antitank mines and trenches, bunkers, ZSU-23 anti-
aircraft guns and Triple-A, T-72 and M-1 tanks and personnel
carriers, battleships, cruisers, destroyers, frigates,
auxiliary and hospital ships amphibious landing craft, TNC-45
missile attack craft (Iraqi) and submarines, smart bombs and
dumb bombs - all that activity is called THE ACTION.
Dogfights, bogeys, bandits and furballs (lots of dogfights at
the same time) added to our lexicon of action.
When we learned about synthetic aperture radar guidance
systems or SARs and AWACs (airborne warning and control system
planes), Lantirn (low-altitude navigation targetting infrared
night guidance systems), ECM (electronic counter measures to
confuse radar) and ECCM (electronic counter counter
measures),Sigint (signals intelligence monitoring of enemy
communications), Navcent (the US naval command), MIF (the
Maritime Interdiction Force), Centaf (Central Air Force
Command - US), Canforme (Canadian Forces Middle East
Headquarters in Bahrain), JSTARS (the Joint surveillance and
target attack radar systems, a new language for communication
and command systems became part of our discourse. We learned
new euphemisms -friendly fire (fire power that killed your own
troops) and collateral damage (non military and non strategic
property damage and civilian deaths). We learned about
Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm and, if you
were a Canadian, Operation Scimitar and Operation Friction for
the Canadian portion of the same thing.
But if we wanted to learn about the intentions and goals
we of all that activity, we listened to the military spokesmen
and the politicians explain why this or that ordinance was
being employed.
Action in the philosophical world is the inversion of what we
mean by action in the ordinary world. Action movies are those
with lots of violence, rapid movements, fights, shootings, car
chases, etc. where the underlying premise is that the viewer
is expected to leave his or her thinking caps at home. For
philosophers, what we see out there - all that firepower, all
that destruction, all that death - they are all mere events.
To be an action, the thoughts of the agent, the intention and
goals, at the very least, must be part of the depiction. When
we only see the physical activity, or read the physical
description, what occurs is a mere event.
In fact, some philosophers are even more perverse.
Inaction and unobservable or non-overt behaviour is sometimes
referred to as an action because the essential component of an
action - the thought side - was said to be present.4 My own
conviction is that this absurdity simply carries to its
logical conclusion what Michael Bratman called, "the
methodological priority of intention in action."5  Instead of
conceiving of action as a whole of which intentions are a part
- the thought side - we turn directly to intentions as
separate 'events' from the action. Elizabeth Anscombe does
this in Intention.6 Donald Davidson operates on the same
presumption.7 Thus, we may begin with the intention of turning
on a computer, the belief that if I plug it in and turn on the
switch the computer will come on, then the resultant rational
decision will be to plug in the computer and turn the switch
on. In the more complex Gulf War, the intention is to remove
Saddam Hussein fron Kuwait and the belief may be that if
sufficient force is utilized Hussein will leave or be pushed
out, therefore the decision is made to use that military
force. We construct a simple syllogism modled like a causal
sequence. But it only appears to work because we seem to have
characterized the intention as a separate entity from the
action itself. In fact, the rational process of decision does
not follow this simple deduction at all as we shall attempt to
show.
If abstracting intentions from an action, as if they were
a separate entity in the head creates one problem, conceiving
of reasons as external entities commits the complementary
error. Getting Hussein out of Kuwait is a reason for using
military force in the Gulf. That is, the intention is
conceived as an external reason sitting in a cage like a puppy
dog in a pet shop which I may or may not adopt as mine.8 The
intention is offered as something standing outside the agent's
head. Do you or don't you want to expell Hussein from Kuwait?
There is no rational deliberation about that choice. You
either want the puppy dog or you don't. Reasoning and acting
only follow if the choice is first made to adopt that external
intention. Reasoning is necessarily reduced to an instrumental
calculation and the choice of goals becomes arbitrary.
One fallacious move is to think of choice as an item to
be selected on a supermerket shelf rather than an internal
process. A second fallacious move is to consider intentions,
not merely as distinguishable, but as seperable elements from
the choice. What we can separate are four kinds of choices,
three of which are decisions per se and one of which is the
action which entails physical activity.
 
The decisions the members of Congress made have to be
distinguished from any action following from the decision.
Congress, by a majority vote, decided to authorize the
President, under certain mild qualifications and imperatives
critical to an interpretation of the constitutional role of
Congress, to use force to get Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait.
The action was an action to authorize, and the decision of
Congress was effectively made, pending merely the signature of
the President himself, which was a foregone conclusion. The
decision of Congress was effectively equivalent to the
action.9 If Congress had decided not to authorize the
President, it too would have been effectively the expression
of the authority of Congress because the status of that
resolution did not require the signature of the President, but
the status of that authority would have been somewhat
different than the resolution supporting the President which
in whole and in all its parts had the effect of being a law.
The decision of Congress also has to be differentiated
from the decision of each of the members of Congress.10 Each
member present was required to decide whether to vote to
authorize the President to use force or to deny such
authorization at the time. These were not the only possible
actions Congress could have taken. Nor did the decisions have
to entail the qualifications that those Resolutions did.
Explaining the formulation of the two major resolutions in the
way they were formulated and the decision to restrict the
debate without any opportunity to amend to those two
formulations would provide material for a different analysis
of explanation. Since only a few of the reasons for those
formulations were made public, that is not the decision with
which we are concerned. We are concerned with the
justifications and explanations of the Congressmen for
supporting one of the resolutions and voting against the
other. (This is not absolutely true since Senator Hatfield
voted against both Resolutions since he was opposed to any use
of force at any time.)
There were effectively only two alternatives before
Congress.
The members of Congress were not deciding what was the best
thing to do under the circumstances given each of the members
intentions and beliefs. They were deciding to do one thing or
the other. They were not deciding what was the best thing to
do. The former is a decision to act; the latter is a
deliberative decision to determine which possibility is the
best choice. They are two very different types of decision. A
deliberative decision which weighs all the alternatives to
decide what would be the best choice is very different than a
decision to do, a decision to act one way or another as
provided for in the Resolutions available. The latter are
situations most common to politicians. They are faced with
very limited choices in the final analysis. They can vote for
Proposition A, Proposition B or abstain. None of these may be
what they would regard as the best choice possible. What they
are deciding if they have thought about it and determined what
the best alternative would be for them is, given the
alternatives available and the circumstances, what alternative
would they prefer to see implemented. The formulation of what
was the best thing to do and what to do could have been
precisely the same for some of the members, but it need not
have been and probably was not for the majority of the
members.
One more type of decision needs to be differentiated from
both a deliberative decision about what is the best thing to
do and a decision to do something given the alternatives
available. That is a decision about the basis for making the
decision, including the processes to be used and the
procedural norms to follow as well as the values and
principles which will be operative to determine what is the
best thing to do and what to do. These decisions about norms,
about which behavioural modes will be considered normative,
which norms are to be considered 'rational', are most
fundamental. "To think something rational is to accept norms
that permit it."11
They are not only factors taken into consideration as part of
the belief structure of the various agents, but the very
decision itself reaffirms or can reconfigure the value
priorities of a particular agent.
A common presumption in contemporary political theory is
that norms are not operative in the field of international
politics. Only coercive power and economic interests matter.
As we shall try to show later, one of the key factors in the
decision had to take into account that the decision was part
of the process of institutionalizing legal authority norms in
the international political arena. In other words, the
decision was not just a matter of what norms each individual
would base his or her decisions on, but what norms would
become operative in a world political community which was
believed to be emerging.12 It is important to note that
decisions about norms usually lead to the most profound
changes in formal authority structures.13 Further, the most
flexible as well as effective normative control mechanisms are
those which are internalized and which allow decisions to be
adjusted based on the non-alignment of anticipations and
emerging situations.14 
We have distinguished between actions, action-decisions,
deliberative decisions and normative decisions. We have
distinguished between actions and events, noting that a mere
event is only the outside of an action while an action has an
inside or a thought side which include intentions and beliefs.
In order to provide the ground for the discussion of
authoritative legal norms in the international field, I now
want to make a parallel distinction between internal and
external factors that enter into making a decision. There are
authority factors, influence factors and power factors, each
with an internal and an external dimension.
In offering reasons for their decision, many of the
members of Congress offered the words of historians -
Thucydides is one example I give in the anaysis of the case -
and other experts. Many military figures and former cabinet
ministers, particularly former Ministers of Defence and
Secretaries of State, were cited for their opinions on both
side of the debate, but the most frequent figure that I
believe was cited was the analysis made by Judge Webster, the
head of the CIA, both from his testimony before the Armed
Services Committee and in a letter he wrote on the second day
of the debate which provided his assessment of the effects of
economic sanctions on the military and economic capacity of
Iraq. These authority figures were cited for their expertise
and insight. The belief in the verity and value of what they
said constitutes an expert authority source and an internal
belief factor in affecting the decision of the member of
Congress.
This authoritative belief in a fact or an anticipated
outcome (or in some cases a value) is to be contrasted with a
formal authority who, from his or her position, commands that
a certain decision be made. Such a formal authority would be
an external factor affecting the decision. Since the party
whips were not used in this vote and many, many of the members
went to great lengths to stress that each individual was
making a decision on his or her own responsibility without
some authority instructing them how to vote, this external
factor can, at least in the first instance, unless evidence is
available to the contrary, be discounted as affecting the
decision. The issue of formal authority did, however,
influence the actual decision to be made. For there had
traditionally been a struggle between Congress and the
President on whether Congress had the exclusive responsibility
to declare war. (Why the President's action in imposing an
economic embargo, which is generally considered an act of war,
was not challenged as following within the exclusive
perogative of Congress, I was not able to ascertain.) This was
a struggle over formal authority which influenced the
resolutions, their wording and the order upon which the
members voted, but no one in formal authority appeared to try
to affect the vote per se.
Though one often uses the phrase that those whose
expertise was cited influenced the decision, in our terms we
will be more precise. An expert and an intellectual influence
will be differentiated as follows. An expert is cited for
information about a particular fact or an expected outcome or,
as I said, even a value assessment such as what characterizes
a just war, though the latter was rarely if ever utilized in
this debate. An intellectual influence is cited for the
argument utilized which persuaded the member of Congress. When
James Baker was cited after the breakdown of the talks with
Aziz and his assessment that he detected not a whit of give in
the Iraqi position, he is being cited as an expert, a source
of authentic authority about a fact, which could or could not
be accurate. When President Bush is cited for his belief that
if the threat of war is made more real for Saddam Hussein that
will improve the possibilities of peace, however slim those
possibilities are, "because the only thing SADdam understands
is force", then Bush is serving as an 'intellectual'
influence. When a constituent is cited for saying to a member
of Congress, "Make sure we don't go to war; make sure my boy
on the S.S. Saratoga does not come home in a body bag", that
is considered an emotional influence on the heart strings of
the Congressman or woman. In either case, the influence is an
internal one affecting or reinforcing the beliefs of the
agent.
An external influence is a material rather than an
intellectual or emotional one or one which influences by
example. A payoff is a material influence, which was the
concern of the inquiry of the Ethics Committee in the Senate
into the Keating-five. If the influence is a matter of
withholding votes or promising a vote, it is also an external
one. It is influence as pressure. Internal influences act by
persuasion. Internal influences are those which effect the
beliefs of the agent; external influences are those which only
influence the actions of the agent.
Power too has an internal aspect and an external one. If
Saddam Hussein says that unless Kuwait cedes territory to give
Iraq access to the Gulf, Iraq will invade Kuwait (assuming
that Iraq was even 'kind' enough to actually bother to
threaten Kuwait), then that is an external dimension of power.
When the United States threatens to use military force to
expel Iraq from Kuwait and does, under the auspices of the
United Nations, use force to enforce an economic emargo on
Iraq, then those actions and threats employ coercive external
power. Some believe that coercive power is the only relevant
operating factor. "We define rational political action as
action which is motivated by the pursuit of power payoffs
which result from control of political office."15 When supposed
scholars adopt the view that all politics in the domestic as
well as the international arena (as we already suggested, we
will try to demonstrate that this is no longer the case even
in the international arena) is simply a matter of coercive
power, we get reductionist nonsense.
Power is internal when the speakers, particularly near
the end of the debate, congratulated themselves for taking the
responsibility and summoning the concentration, the energy,
the stamina, the will to decide for themselves whether
military force ought or ought not to be used. Power, in the
internal sense, is the creative energy believed to exist
within each of us. It is not inherently and need not become
coercive when it is externalized.16
What made the debate so fascinating was not only the
importance of the issue but its very high tone and its
apparent freedom from external authority, influence and power
factors which do not affect beliefs but only the behaviour of
the agent with the responsibility of making the decision. That
is also what makes the case so excellent as a basis for
analyzing the nature of justification and rational
explanation.
Beliefs and Reasons
The general framework for justification appears to be
precisely the same as that which is usually referred to as
'rational explanation' or 'intentionalist explanations'. that
is, explanations that historians use in terms of the beliefs
or thoughts of the agent. Given the goals of the agent and his
or her beliefs about the situation, including the anticipated
outcomes of the alternative choices available to him\her, and
the values held by the agent applicable to those choices,
those Beliefs1 are used to justify or explain the decision to
take or authorize an action.17 The framework consists of four
main categories of Belief: Goals or Objectives and the
Qualification to those goals, Norms both of conduct and
decision making, perceptions of the past and current
situation, including the means available to achieve the Goal,
together referred to as the Conditions, and the  anticipated
and possible Consequences of the decision. Those four
categories can be configured as follows:
The Framework of Justification and Rational Explanation
Existing    Future
Values Norms - of conduct    Goals - ultimate &
   = policy  
immediate
 - of speech    Qualifications
   = procedural
Facts Conditions - current   Consequences -
direct
   & past              - long
term     - means              &
                    
    1 I use beliefs with a small 'b' to indicate what the
agent thought the situation was and what its expected
consequences would be. I use Beliefs with a capital 'B' to
stand for all the thoughts of the agent, including his/her
goals and norms applicable to judging the situation, as well
as the beliefs about the situation and its anticipated
outcomes.
indirect
   available
Now these Beliefs may be conventionally held or
established and even verified. They may also may be subjective
beliefs. The fact that they are established - such as the
belief in the superiority of the white race so prevalent in
the thirties in the Western World - does not mean they are
true. It does mean they do not belong to the subjective realm
since the community acts to confirm what is believed even if
it is false.
Further, some of the Beliefs are proximate to the action
while others are more remote. I am not merel speaking of the
difference between ultimate goals - establishing a new world
order - and immediate goals - getting Saddam Hussein out of
Kuwait, and immediate and long term consequences, but
procedural norms which are more remote from the issue than the
policy norms implicit in the debate.
The specification of Beliefs can become more detailed and
more complicated. A decision may be about doing something,
about what the best thing to do is or about the normative
basis for making a decision. A policy norm may be about
procedures (agreeing to back whatever the majority decision
is), or, as in this case, about the best technique to achieve
a given end. It may not appear to be about the objectives but
an analysis may indicate that a debate about objectives was
central to the debate. It may also be about anticipated
consequences. As we will try to indicate in the next chapter,
the debate was really about all of these even though it was
cast in the form about the best means to achieve an agreed
upon end. Thus, the debate about what action to take is not
simply about the outside or physical behaviour to perform, but
about norms and goals, the past, present and the future. 
The following chart attempts to incorporate all of these
factors into a visual schema:
[INSERT CHART]
Formal and Substantive Rationality
Antigone and the anti-war party, sceptics and internalist
historicists all give priority to the internal components of
the soul, whether they be sentiments of the heart, passions or
ideas in the head. Creon and other Patriots in stressing civic
duty, Empirical instrumental calculators stressing material
interests, and externalist historicists such as Turner and his
geographical theory of the role of the frontier in forging the
American character, all stress the primacy of external factors
in influencing the actions we take. The issue is one of
priority not exclusivity. The externalists will tend to reduce
reasons or beliefs to a subspecies of cause. Internalists will
stress the independence of beliefs from external causes. The
difference is primarily about the direction in how the inside
of an action is oriented to the outside.
The six schools of nonrational action can also be
distinguished in a second way, by the type of decision they
each stress. In Antigone and Creon, an action is a mode of
giving witness to the norms to which one is committed; the
primacy is placed on normative commitments. In the case of the
sceptics and those commited to instrumental reasoning based on
the analysis of the empirical conditions, the stress is on
deciding the best thing to do. Decision making is primarily a
deliberation about choosing the best means given a chosen end.
From the historicist perspective, given the values and
convictions of the parties as imbued by the society, or even
the conflicting ways of seeing the world inherited from the
process of social formation or the intellectual ideas of our
ancestors, then the decision will merely be one of assessing
which of the alternatives before us best suits the inherited
way we see the world. The decision will neither be normative
nor deliberative but will be an action-decision, a decision to
do 'A' or 'B'.
The six schools can be distinguished in a third way. To
what extent do the decisions make universalist or merely
particularist claims. All six schools make universalist claims
about their conclusions. For those impelled by duty, they know
the values they hold, the social values to which they are
committed, are not held universally, but both the believers in
moral duty and the believers in civil duty are convinced that
the values they hold ought to be universal. Their action gives
expression to the will to actualize that universality. The
sceptics believe that although the passions and convictions we
hold are socially conditioned, there are universal laws which
can be discerned to understand and predict how people will
always or probably behave because the laws governing passions
are universal. The empirical instrumentalists hold that
everyone is a possessive individualist out to maximize his or
her personal material interests and therefore will deliberate
in precisely the same way given the perception of those
interests. What is particular and relative to anyone is the
particular norms and perceptions that individual has of the
world given the way s/he was habituated or the material
conditions in which one finds oneself. Even the historicists
believe that the conclusions they derive from the particular
way they have of perceiving the world has a universalist claim
precisely because, built into the particular intellectual or
material conditioned mode of seeing the world is a claim that
it is the best. Thus, though America was shaped by the
frontier, that conditioning gave American's their essential
faith in the highest and most universal value, liberty from
coercive restraints. Similar, if America was shaped by the
ideas of John Locke, it too gave Americans a claim that those
ideas embodied universal truths about human nature. Any
actions consistent with that understanding of what it is to be
human, had to have universal validity. Thus, every perspective
comes to the conclusion that the decision they make or the
action they take has universal validity.
The above three ways of understanding the six schools can
be depicted by the following schema in which the direction of
the arrows indicate whether that particular non-rational
perspective is internalist or externalist while the corner
locations indicate the primary decision type, while the
location in the upper versus the lower half indicate whether
the beginning and end points are universalist or
particularist.
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Rationality and Reasonableness
If, for the patriots and moralists, sceptics and
historicists, there really is no individual choice, that
perspective runs contrary to what the average American
believes. Fundamental to the American psyche is a faith in
liberty. Liberty is the freedom to choose. And choice requires
both knowledge upon which to base judgement and values which
provide Americans with a solid ground of conviction. Most
Americans believe they both can and should decide what is the
right thing to do, though they delegate that responsibility to
elected representatives and then observe the process to see if
they agree with the decision that is taken.
This does not mean that rationality is differentiatiated
from the pursuit of wealth. As C.B. Macpherson depicted the
essence of a capitalist state built on the Lockean model, the
roots of the sovereign power of the state rested on a concept
of man who is, "essentially a purposive, rational creature,
but the essence of rational behaviour was increasingly held to
lie in unlimited individual appropriation."18 If that man is
distracted from the pursuit of wealth by the perceived need to
protect the ability to engage in that pursuit, that is, in
Lockean terms, in the protection of 'freedom', then the goal
is redefined in moral terms, but rationality continues to be
perceived as the instrument for deciding the means to persue
the goal of accumulating wealth even if, in order to secure
that persuit, the rationality has to shift to other persuits
as well, such as the science and politics of war.
When rationality is reduced to instrumentality and
explicated to be a product of a capitalist system, we have a
substantive theory of rationality (concrete material
circumstances determine a particular 'rationality') as well as
a substantive theory of society (societies are different, in
this case, dependent on the system of ownership and control of
property). This is not, of course, how Americans think of
themselves. They view themselves as embodying what is
universal in all humans, that is, they reason just like
everyone else if they reason properly. Further, the values
they hold are universal and true and not relative to their
existing society. They have a conception of themselves which
presupposes both a formal theory of rationality and of
society. It is not surprising then that the major debate in
America in the philosophical theory of rationality has been
between two versions of rational and normative formalism. Both
stand in opposition to the historicist who holds that
rationality is particular to a particular society and the
norms of society are a product of the economic or other
material conditions (such as geography) of that society.
Instead of defining rationality in terms of an
instrumental version of rationality, the analysis of means to
pursue a purpose, one which is particular to a capitalist
society ("blood for oil") in the historicist conception, or
defining rationality as a formal process of calculation which
is universal to all humans in order to pursue goals which are
freely adopted as the highest values which should be made
universal for all societies (freedom, the sanctity of the
nation-state) in the formalist conception, rationality can be
defined as the process of finding a means that will be the
least incompatible between different sets of goals and values.
Where those purposes are not elevated to universality nor
reduced to a product of the material circumstances of that
society, but are viewed as being freely chosen to at least
serve a vision which aspires to universality while, at the
same time, recognizing that the vision is also a product of
particular historical influences which may colour or distort
the vision, then we have a conception of reasonableness.
That conception is the inverse of the sceptical position
which holds a formalist theory of society (differences between
societies are irreleant to the comprehension of human nature)
and a substantive theory of rationality where reason is simply
an instrumental device to achieve goals defined elsewhere. In
a reasonable conception of rationality, societies have
different values and norms as products of their history and
material circumstances (geography, economic mode of
organization), but reasoning is not simply instrumental in
achieving particular values, but reasoning affects and can
alter the values we hold even if we believe the values we hold
are immutable, unchangeable and eternal. Those shifts may take
place because of the incongruencies unveiled by the reasoning
process, both in the logic of reasoning itself and between
previous results of that reason in encountering reality.
Reasonableness is a conception of rationality which is
not instrumental in terms of choosing the means to reach an
agreed goal rooted in principle. Reasonableness is the
consideration of various points of view in order to work out a
compromise which will have repercussions on the definition of
the goal and the norms held by the parties to the agreement.
In contrast to America, Canada, as an example, was constituted
on a policy of accommodation rather than on an elaboration of
principles and devising the means to live up to those
principles. Whereas Thomas Paine had observed that the
uniqueness of the American Revolution rested precisely on its
being a revolution in the principles and practices of
government, George Brown, one of Canada's founding fathers and
a strident voice of reform, saw a Canada where conscience did
not reside in the hearts of the people, in popular will, but
in 'his majesty's loyal opposition', in  parliamentary debate,
in rational dialogue and in responsible government. "The
Reform party that went on to Dominion and Ontario politics
with Confederation would profess the mid-Victorian
parliamentary democracy of George Brown, not the elective
democracy of the neighbouring American republic."19
Reasonableness is the ideology of the Whigs. American
revolutionairies were not Whigs; they were Liberals. Though
both had to overcome the ancient doctrine of the divine right
of kings in order to vest sovereignty in the people, in the
Liberal tradition, the sovereign people, through their
representatives, directly produced a constitution and
constructed the institutions of government. Government was the
direct product of the application of first principles. In the
Whig interpretation, the rationale for government per se was
rooted in the logical premise that government was intended to
express the sovereign will of the people, but the institutions
of government - parliament, the monarchy - were products of a
history of reasonable compromises between two different
institutions set up by sovereign will. The Whigs were not
Levellers. The Earl of Shaftesbury, a leading Whig, assigned a
primary role in government to the nobility.20 The Whigs were
unwilling to go back to first principles and risk civil war
and the horrors and political uncertainties that conflict
produced when they first argued for the exclusion of the
Papist James from the throne. The people were to be allowed a
role in government, but according to the guidance of their
betters. With the loss or destruction of John Locke's First
Treatise on Government, the Second Treatise on Government was
read as the justification for the Glorious Revolution of 1688
rather than an argument for why and how one candidate for the
monarchy could be excluded from taking up his position in
favour of another candidate. Locke became the prime
philosophical foundation for Liberalism rather than a strong
Whig.21
"In the coming of the American Revolution 'men sought
liberty, knowing what they sought,' as Lord Acton pointed out.
Instead of persuing 'some sensible object,' Americans
challenged the Whig equation of morality and expediency by
refusing to adjust their conduct to the familiar conventions
of opposition politics. The American revolutionairies 'claimed
to draw from the pure wells of Whiggism,' wrote Acton. 'But
they carried Whiggism from the stages of compromise to the
crowning stage of principle.' In England the Whig mentality
led statesmen to 'the belief that the sordid element alone
prevailed in the colonies,' an element that, had it prevailed,
could have been accommodated by urging colonists to consider
their economic interests, weigh the consequences of their
political actions, and concede to the familiar processes of
negotiation and compromise. But by endowing political ideas
with moral significance, the American Revolution stood as a
reproach to Whig politics and ushered in a new episode of
modern liberalism. 'The Whigs governed by compromise. The
Liberal begins the reign of ideas.'"22
While many Canadians are embarrassed by the overreaching
pride of Americans and their constant exhibition of their
belief that they can accomplish what they will provided they
will it hard enough and pursue goals with a disciplined
application of rational analysis, the Canadian belief in
'sweet reason', in the reasonable rather than the rational per
se, has its own detractors. A Canada constituted on a policy
of accommodation rather than an elaboration of principles was
derided by liberal continentalists like Frank Underhill. "This
seeming incapacity for ideas, or rather this habit of carrying
on our communal affairs at a level at which ideas never quite
emerge into an articulate life of their own, has surely
impoverished our Canadian politics."23 In this critical view,
rationality that is not an instrument of determination and
purpose, is 'sweet reason' and saccharine. To be reasonable in
this sense is to be 'wimpy'. Pierre Trudeau replaced Whiggism
motif as the dominant motif of Canadian politics with
Liberalism.
If we attribute the traditional "reasonableness" of
Canadians simply to the particular result necessitated in a
state with two founding nations with two quite different
outlooks and/or to the encounter of the Canadians with the
harsh northern landscape which they could not conquer but only
adapt to it, then we explain this rational pattern in
historicist terms. But if we take it to be a universal
possibility and an ideal to strive for by all humans, then,
though it emerged as a product of a unique history and set of
circumstances, it is held out as a universal potential and
ideal for the world.
Unfortunately, as we observe before us, countries founded
on accommodation and mutual advantage have a much greater
propensity to unravel than countries founded on natural rights
and service to history and high principle. America was founded
on a faith in the sovereign will of the people in which each
person was endowed with reason and the ability to ascertain
how to use that reason to achieve the high purpose given to
Americans as both their inalienable right and their duty to
defend and serve. This combination of hard realism and lofty
idealism is a very different conception of reason than
negotiations between governments at one level and one's mother
country at another level. For in the realm of sweet
reasonableness, when you grow up and the siblings leave their
mother's protective embrace and more particularly, when
'mutual advantage' may no longer be mutual or advantageous
given the enticements of other alternatives, and when there
exists no higher purpose to hold the family together,24
reasonableness may be inadequate to the task of holding a
country together. Reasonableness as an instrument of
accommodation is no match for formal rationality as an
instrument to carry out a task which it is one's historical
destiny to fulfill and which requires determination and
resolve.
The difference between formal rationality and
reasonableness can be understood further through the classical
distinction between scientific reasoning, or episteme, and
practical judgement. The latter is concerned with beliefs, not
facts, and adjudicates on the basis of experience. If,
however, the value principles are presumed to be self evident
truths in themselves, or even through the eyes of the sceptic,
as convictions of passion not subject to alteration by means
of rational discourse, then rationalisty is and can be
scientific since it is simply the calculation of the best
means to achieve a given end or set of values which require no
debate or judgement.
Rationality and Values
Before we presume that reason is simply an accommodation
between two different value perspectives or, alternatively, is
simply a calculation to achieve a set of given values already
in place, it might be worthwhile to consider a view of reason
as a mode of determining which values are best and not just
what the best instrument is to achieve a set of values upon
which there is already an assumed agreement or even what to do
in a given situation, knowing full well that the decision will
have repercussions on one's values. To undertake the task of
analyzing a possible process of reasoning to determine which
values to adopt, unlike Hume, we presume that process must be
done from the standpoint of an individual in history, for
there is no absolute standpoint from which to adjudicate
values. Each of us comes with our individual and collective
sets of beliefs carrying the baggage of our particular
histories. The issue is whether, given our rooted perspectives
and values, knowledge and debate can be relevant to
determining those values and the priorities among them. To put
it another way, given that we come to a problem with a given
set of interests and values, is a critical analysis of those
norms and values relevant to the conception of rationality?
We can claim that values can be critically assessed for
their inconsistencies and lack of coherence. "Rationality is
not properly predicated of individual norms or goals of
behaviour; it is a feature of the interrelationships of a set
of such norms or goals...Conversely, we do not usually need or
look for explanations of rational behaviour other than its
conformity with the appropriate rules or norms, provided,
however, that these normas themselves constitute a coherent
set and do not require explanations of their own
inconsistencies or of the ability of those who follow them to
sustain them despite contradictions."25
In this account, values only become questionable when formal
logical criteria are breached. And only then by abandoning
rational explanation in favour of irrational explanation.
The problem of detecting any inconsistencies is, however,
more difficult than it first appears because value itself is
an equivocal notion, as Aristotle made clear. When we say
apples are good, and rosy cheeks are good, and health is good,
we often mean three very different things. Apples are good
because they contribute to our well being. Exercise is said to
be good in the same sense. But when we say rosy cheeks are
good, we do not mean that rosy cheeks contribute to our well
being but, rather, that rosy cheeks are a sign of our well
being. Good which refers to something which contributes to
something else which is good, or good which is a sign of
something else which is good, are both very different senses
of good than that which is considered good-in-itself, such as
well being.
For reasoning to be relevant to a choice over values and
not just over the best instrument, one value must be
considered fundamental. At the same time, that value must be
recognized to be context-based and without any absolute
status. In other words, though reason may be relevant to
making choices about values, there may be no general
principles or norms by which to make that adjudication.
The problem is whether something like the preservation of
international law and the integrity of sovereign states can be
considered something which is good-in-itself, or something
which is good because it preserves international peace, or is
simply good because it serves as a smoke detector such that
breaches of international law merely trigger an alarm that a
tyranny has breached the norms of acceptable conduct in
international affairs.
We have to first determine what value we attach to a value
that is held. It seems clear that in the American value
structure, international law is not something inherently good,
but can serve as a trip wire. International law may also be
considered a contributing factor to international peace. Even
the latter is not a good-in-itself which, in the American
lexicon, usually refers back to the freedom and happiness of
the individual. Whether you agree or not, to engage in a
rational consideration of what is good, you must start from
some fundamental presumption of what is good-in-itself. In the
American Congress, this was not a subject of direct debate.
To consider the status of values as inherent to the
conception of rationality, using the criterion of consistency,
does not help if the value is held in two quite distinctive
equivocal meanings. For example, upholding the centrality of
the UN but regarding breaches of international law regarding
the sovereignty of nation-states as only a trip wire seems, at
least on the surface, to be inconsistent, whereas believing
that breaches in international law of this type is virtually a
causus belli may be consistent. Do we then presume rationality
and, therefore, that the Americans believed that the breach of
international was a cause, or at least a condition
contributing to the breakdown of order, and not simply a sign
of real future danger?
In this case, I suggest the evidence may be stronger in
support of the latter interpretation, that Americans merely
regard a breach in international law as a signalling device to
attend to the danger of a real threat and was not in itself as
a cause of military action. But if that were the case, then
the action would be deemed irrational and require an
irrational explanation according to the Izenberg formula. A
finding of inconsistency can be used to select from among
several meanings referring to the same value to favour
consistency without weighing the evidence fairly. Instead of
the inconsistency being used to fathom the agent's value
priorities at a different level or to explore the tensions in
the agent's value system, a presumption is immediately made
that the agent is irrational just because he was inconsistent.
There is another problem. Though individual liberty and
happiness may be at the bedrock of American values, it is not
always relevant in guiding a decision about what to do. In
some contexts it is irrelevant. For the pilots captured by the
Iraqis, survival may be the top value. To survive, it may be
critical to engage in what might, in another context, be
considered a meaningless task, in order to demonstrate some
small area of control over one's life. It may also be
worthwhile complying with the requests of torturers to utter
publicly the words forced upon you rather than resist to one's
last breath instead of accepting the indignity of following a
coercive order under torture. The positive value may just as
well occur in nuanced forms of resistance as in outright
confrontations.
Values are equivocal. Inconsistencies may be more
revealing about the agent's set of values than any presumption
of irrationality. Values, even the highest ones, are only
relevant to certain contexts and have a different status and
priority in other contexts. Is there another way they can be
approached as an integral element of what is considered to be
rational?
There is a radically different tact we can take to
approaching an evaluation of the value content of a belief
system as part of the requirements of a rational analysis. Our
object as the interpreter is not to evaluate the values nor
presume they are fixed and given, but to get closer to the
evolving values of the agent by refusing both to reify them or
to evaluate them as if one was in a position to do so. Our
responsibility as an interpreter is to attend to the debate,
to avoid imposing on the debate our own prejudices while
approaching the analysis of the debate with the expectations
that must be there if we are well trained scholars. "For it is
necessary to keep one's gaze fixed on the thing throughout all
the distractions that the interpreter will constantly
experience in the process and which originate in himself."26
The evaluation that goes on will be the reassessment of our
own expectations and the evaluation of our own values as we
remain open to any transformation of values revealed by the
debate.
A more radical version of critique emerged in the
Frankfurt school. Inherent in the presumptions we brought to
bear on our analysis were presumptions of freedom and autonomy
which are both employed in evaluating the rationality of the
beliefs and actions of agents and were themselves transformed
through the analysis to a higher level of conceptual
clarification and realization. In fact, critique itself
entails a reevaluation of a conception of rationality and the
abandonment of freedom and autonomy when rationality is
reduced to calculation of the best means to achieve an end
assuming a given set of values. "Having given up autonomy,
reason has become an instrument. In the formalistic aspect of
subjective reason, stressed by positivism, its unrelatedness
to objective content is emphasized; in its instrumental
aspect, stressed by pragmatism, its surrender to heteronomous
contents is emphasized. Reason has become completely harnessed
to the social process. Its operational value, its role in the
domination of men and nature, has been made the sole
criterion."27
What are the characteristics of freedom and rationality
if they were not denied by the instrumentalist paradigm? "The
individual must be free to acquire the means to attain his
end: self-preservation and growth. However, this kind of
freedom is variable to the highest degree: in history, it
ranges from the mere physical ability to accept and use the
means of subsistence, to the power of domination and
exploitation. And it includes a rich freedom of choice within
a strong framework of repression, of unfreedom."28 Inner
freedom or freedom of conscience always remained inalienable.
Freedom of thought, however, since it is only freedom if it is
translated into expression, "has been politically restricted
throughout history - if not by direct censorship then by
withholding, from the larger population, the intellectual and
material means which would enable them to develop and express
free thought."29 So we must be alert to the degree freedom of
expression is restricted in what can be said in the debate and
how it is said and, if it is restricted, we must try to
account for those restrictions and measure their impact on the
debate.
But we should not make any presumptions that there are
restrictions or define the nature of those restrictions in
advance nor presume their role is to enhance repression and
serve the lords of exploitation. Otherwise reason becomes a
tool again, but this time a tool for the worst of all
manipulators, dogmatism. 
"Reason involved in the argument against dogmatism has
definitely taken up this interest as its own - it does not
define the moment of decision as external to its sphere.
Rather, the decisions of the subjects are measured rationally
against the one objective decision, which is required by the
interest of reason itself. Reason has not yet renounced the
will to the rational."30
Was the debate in Congress simply a device to manipulate
the public in support of the war? Or was the debate directed
towards raising the consciousness of America, to
enlightenment, to human beings who live with one another and
must achieve a modicum of common understanding? Was the debate
directed towards enhancing reasonableness and enabling human
beings to act in concert using speech as the mode of
communication and not coercion of any type?
The key measure of that emancipation will be the degree to
which dogmatism was overcome since dogmatism, if it pervades
the whole thought process, needs none of the external
constraints that coercion frequently employs. To what degree
were those engaged in the debate devoted to overcoming
dogmatism and making the advancement of the cause of reason a
central objective? That kind of test is not applicable to
debates among intellectuals because this was not a thought
exercise. This was not a test of cognitive capacity, but a
productive debate which had, as a direct outcome, action.
To the degree the debate was rational, to that degree it
had to challenge the most basic, inherited beliefs of
Americans that have become reified as an ideology which no
longer allows those values to be subjected to a microsscopic
critical examination. To the degree those values were just
basic axioms from which to deduce what the best course of
action was, to that extent dogmatism ruled. The values of
America had to be up for grabs. To the degree they were, then
the debate was rational in this higher sense. It would not
then just be a debate to choose the best means to achieve a
defined goal.
As we shall see in our analysis of the debate, the
rhetoric paid lip service to the belief that it was just that
- a debate over the best mmeans to achieve an agreed end. But
the content of the debate belied that formulation, thereby
undermining, at least in part, the foundational character of
that formulation. To the degree the presumption of
instrumentality was not overtly challenged, to that degree
emancipation was put off. To the degree the behaviour was a
debate about instrumentality per se and a challenge to basic
values, even though unacknowledged, to that degree the debate
was rational in this higher sense.
Rationality and Rationalization
Jurgen Habermas distinguishes four levels of
rationalization, the first two levels of which exclude norms
from the argument while the next two levels subordinate so-
called irrational values to technological procedures.31 To what
extent was the debate based on scientific predictions which
prevented a consideration of the value issues at stake. To
that degree we had a first level rationalization. Rationality
was reduced to efficacy.
But when the debate was whether one technique - sanctions
- was better than another technique - the use of military
force, but the evidence for the efficacy of either was
inconclusive, then victory in the debate did not depend on the
scientific evidence per se, but on which conclusion received
better support according to the rules of decision making. 
Given a set of goals and a set of norms and given the facts
and predictions we have, however inconclusive, rationality is
the process of following second order decison norms to reach a
conclusion.
In both of the above cases, the values themselves are not
subject to debate. This does not mean they are not being
debated, only that the debaters do not acknowledge that that
is what the debate is about. On the third level of
rationalization, there is an acknowledgement in the debate
that the decision is being made in the context of Saddam
Hussein, defined already as the opponent, who has his own
values and self-interest at stake in opposition to those
conducting the debate. The values are acknowledged. But the
debate represses a consideration of the validity of Saddam's
values and interests and relegates them to precategorization
as irrational. At stake is the survival of the American value
system, which is seen to be at risk, but which must be
defended at minimal risk in terms of the sacrifice of the
lives of American soldiers.
There is, however, a fourth level of rationalization
which is much more subtle. In the decision model, as we shall
see, the goals are set up as fixed entities. The calculation
of the likely consequences following one choice rather than
another is done as if that calculation had no effect on
reformulating the goals. But a proper feedback system, such as
those already incorporated in much of the high tech equipment
employed in the war, would recognize that the analysis and
reanalysis of the data and the likely outcomes will reflect
back and alter the goals. As the cybernetic system becomes
operative, however, the norms that went into the reified
decision model remain reified even as the goals are altered
and modified. There is no recognition that the process itself
of deciding and the substantive content fed into the process
of decision making also has a profound effect on the value
presumptions. The values are not inert. They are effected by
the debate and by the actions that follow.
Rationality serves the cause of reason to the degree it
undermines each of the above four levels of rationalization
and grapples directly with the issue of values.
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